# Suddenness and the Composition of Poetic Thought

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*you Tiresias*
*if you know*
*know damn well*
*or*
*else you*
*don't.*

Ezra Pound, note in pencil on the carbon typescript of *The Waste Land*.

# Contents

# Acknowledgements

Numerous anonymous reviewers. For your commitment to a whole other economy of thought.

Most of all, I would like to thank my mother, Anne Connellan, for her tireless scouring of the manuscript, her encouragement in the literal sense of the word, and her love of poetry.

## PERMISSIONS

# Introduction

## *On the Gradual Production of Thoughts whilst Speaking*

'If there is something you wish to know', Heinrich von Kleist addresses an old army friend, 'and by meditation you cannot find it . . . speak about it with the first acquaintance you encounter.' Yet the point is not to benefit from that other person's opinion. 'On the contrary, you yourself should tell him at once what it is you wish to know'.[1] Kleist's essay continues in this faux dialogic vein: 'I see the astonishment in your face. I hear you reply that when you were young you were advised only to speak of things you already understood'. But that is not the only approach to learning. There have been numerous occasions when Kleist has tried to understand a difficult point of law, or a problem in algebra, only to find that if he turns to the nearest interlocutor and simply speaks about the matter, 'I learn more than I should have arrived at by perhaps hours of brooding'.[2] He might have profited by the other's skilful questioning. But,

> because I do have some dim conception at the outset, one distantly related to what I am looking for, if I boldly make a start with that, my mind, even as my speech proceeds, under the necessity of finding an end for that beginning, will shape my first confused idea into complete clarity so that, to my amazement, understanding is arrived at as the sentence ends.[3]

Kleist describes the various hesitation phenomena that discovering one's ideas in the act of uttering them is likely to involve. He might 'dwell lengthily on the conjunctions.' He might 'put in a few unarticulated sounds'. Or he might 'make use of apposition where it is not necessary', all of which strategies will serve to 'spin out' his speech, and so help him 'gain time for the fabrication of my idea in the workshop of my mind'.[4] Yet the temporal gains from such acts are minimal. The 'Gradual Production' (*allmähliche*

*Verfertigung*) Kleist has in mind, in titling this 1806 essay fragment 'On the Gradual Production of Thoughts whilst Speaking' (*Über die allmähliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Reden*), is only *allmähliche* 'gradual' in the sense of 'arrived at piece by piece'. Kleist is writing about what happens in the space of a few seconds.

He pushes on. This is not just a personal whim. 'I believe many a great speaker to have been ignorant when he opened his mouth of what he was going to say'. So the Comte de Mirabeau, responding to the Master of Ceremonies in 1789, when that royal functionary ordered the National Constituent Assembly to disperse, said 'Yes . . . we have heard the King's command', only to repeat, 'Yes, my dear sir . . . we have heard it', buying time, Kleist points out: 'As we see, he is not yet exactly sure of what he intends. "But by what right . . ." he continues, and suddenly a colossal source of ideas is opened up to him, "do you give us orders here?"'[5] Mirabeau, too, was speaking to find out what he had to say, before an entire National Assembly. Elsewhere it might have been a problem in algebra. The 'conviction that he would be able to draw all the ideas he needed from the circumstances themselves and from the mental excitement they generate' made the revolutionary Mirabeau 'bold enough to trust to luck and make a start'.[6]

A Romantic glorification of action over thought? One can detect strains of it in Kleist's other essays, and in his letters.[7] Or a truth revealed in the pressures of that disoriented time? Kleist will shortly be arrested by the French imperial army and locked up as a suspected spy. Only three years earlier, he tried to volunteer for Napoleon's invasion of England. Yet he fought against the revolutionary army as a teenage soldier. And it is a colleague from that early campaigning against revolution whom he is now in 1806 addressing, in an essay extolling Mirabeau. Nor can one ignore the state of Kleist's mind in all this: as he wrote in a letter from Würzburg to his fiancée, Wilhelmine von Zenge, not long before breaking off their engagement, 'I walked, absorbed in my private thoughts, through the arched gateway, and back to the town. Why, I asked myself, doesn't the archway collapse, since it has no support? It stands, I replied, because all the stones are on the verge of collapsing at one and the same time'.[8] Kleist's comment on his first sight of one of Caspar David Friedrich's radically new landscapes is even more traumatised: 'since in its uniformity and boundlessness it has no foreground but the frame, the viewer feels as though his eyelids had been cut off'.[9]

Those epochal and personal extremes lead Kleist to hold fast to something we prefer to ignore. No one's thoughts are immune from the risks of the present moment: 'That a certain excitement of the intelligence is necessary even to revivify ideas we have already had is amply demonstrated whenever open-minded and knowledgeable people are being examined and without any preamble are asked such questions as: What is the state? Or: What is property?'[10]

When it comes to the articulation of what we know, however, certainly we do know it, an element of unpredictability always pertains. 'For it is not we who know things but pre-eminently a certain *condition* of ours which knows'.[11]

'On the Gradual Production of Thoughts whilst Speaking' was not published until 1878, 67 years after its author's suicide. A note beneath an allusion to Kant on its final page reads 'To be continued'.[12] Yet however incomplete the essay, Kleist's reflections offer a rare opening on the most everyday of phenomena. We are all familiar with the possibility of talking off the top of our heads and are familiar with the pejorative construction so regularly placed upon it. Kleist blithely ignores such moralisms, shattering the idealisation they are secretly founded upon, and provides in their stead a stark vision of unpremeditated speaking as a pre-eminent mode of intellectual and even political inquiry. This book argues that Kleist was right. He was right in more ways than even he could know.

## COGNITIVE CONSTRAINT

Kleist was right in more ways than he could know, because he did not own a tape recorder. Widely available from the late 1950s, such devices were swiftly adopted by scholars for the unprecedented access they gave to the phenomena of real-time speech production. The corpuses of utterances that have since arisen are 'fundamental to the enterprise of theorizing language', Michael Halliday and Christian Matthiessen remark.[13] They add that prior to that point linguistics had been 'like physics before 1600: having little reliable data, and no clear sense of the relationship between observation and theory'.[14] Wallace Chafe concurs, noting, 'Technology has put us now, for the first time in human history, in a position to understand what spoken language is really like, though for various reasons we have not yet taken full advantage of this potential'.[15] These three linguists are referring to evidence like the following, which is what the tape revealed of the speech patterns of a 'confident and experienced public speaker' in the course of his PhD defence in the early 1970s. Single dashes stand for pauses of anything up to half a second, double dashes pauses between 0.5 and 0.9 seconds.

(1)  And it seems
(2)  to be – –
(3)  if a word is fairly – – high on the frequency list –
(4)  I haven't made any count –
(5)  but – just – – impressionistically, – – um – – the chances are – –
(6)  that you get a – compound – or – another – – phonologically deviant – – form –with ah

(7)  which is already in other words

(8)  which is fairly frequent – ly the same – phonological shape.[16]

The speaker seems to have a general idea of what he wants to say and to that extent he is distinct from Kleist's experimental speaker, advancing to see wherever the sentence he has begun will take him. But it is just as clear that this PhD candidate – I am citing from Andrew Pawley and Frances Hodgetts Syder's corpus of New Zealand and Australian speakers – is improvising the exact wording of each of these eight clauses, as he proceeds. He starts making a general claim over clauses (1)–(3), hesitantly, interrupts that claim in clause (4) on realising he should clarify what grounds he has for making it, has two attempts at that clarification in clause (5), the second of these ('the chances are – –') not quite reconcilable with the first ('but – just – – impressionistically'), returns to table the claim at clause (6), only to interrupt it again at (7) ('which is already in other words') in search of a more accurate formulation, and then interrupts that attempt in turn at clause (8). Evidently this PhD candidate did not have his 'full sentence' in mind, prior to embarking upon the step-by-step process of uttering it.

What is more, the candidate makes use of the very devices Kleist reports resorting to, in the course of his seemingly more experimental speech productions. We saw Kleist claim that when engaging in that process he will 'dwell lengthily on the conjunctions', for doing so will help him 'gain time for the fabrication of my idea in the workshop of my mind.'[17] Compare how the candidate pauses after the 'but –' in clause (5) above, or after the 'or –' in clause (6). The words 'be' and 'are' at the end of clauses (2) and (5), with their attendant pauses, are clearly offering similar purchase. We also heard Kleist state that he will 'put in a few unarticulated sounds' mid-sentence, as he struggles to work out how that sentence will conclude. Kleist was referring to the *äh*, *ähm* and related sounds that German speakers use as their equivalents to the 'um' in the middle of the candidate's 5th clause, or the 'ah' that concludes clause (6). Far from wrong or thoughtless uses of 'proper' language, such filler words can be seen in context to be quite literally thoughtful: they indicate that the candidate is thinking up what they have to say, in the very process of saying it. The 'in other words' in clause (7) shows the candidate engaging in 'apposition where it is not necessary' as well. What we have here, in short, is evidence of a speaker who, like Kleist, has an as yet inexact formulation in mind, decides to 'boldly make a start with that' and, 'under the necessity of finding an end for that beginning', arrives *allmähliche*, 'piece by piece', at the detailed formulation of their thinking.[18]

What Kleist could not have known back in 1806 is how everyday a phenomenon this is. That so few outside the professional circles of linguists, interviewers and transcribers are aware of it today underlines this point. We

have surprisingly little capacity to recall the actual language we hear: the interposition of 80 syllables is enough, according to one study, for listeners to forget the syntactic structure of a sentence they have just heard – as opposed to the ideas heard in it.[19] This is so much the case that speakers in bilingual environments have been shown regularly to have forgotten the language in which they were at any given past moment speaking, even as they retain the ideas discussed.[20] Starkest evidence of all for this forgetting of the literal is the dialogue in the books and films and television series we consume nightly, a systematic departure from the piece-by-piece, fragmentary and regularly revised way in which any of us actually speak.

Countering this pervasive, popular obliviousness as to the graduated, one might even say myopic, form our speech takes, Andrew Pawley and Frances Hodgetts Syder write, 'There is in fact a sizeable collection of evidence of several different kinds that the largest unit of novel discourse that can be fully encoded in one coding operation is a single clause of eight to ten words'.[21] The reader can stop and listen closely to themselves or those around them in conversation, to get an immediate sense of this. As Pawley and Syder remark: 'When the spontaneous speaker embarks on a stretch of novel discourse extending over several clauses, he [*sic*] does not (as a rule) know in advance exactly what he is going to say beyond the first few words. He must gamble on being able to finish what he has started'.[22] What we are ultimately dealing with here are 'biological limits on what the brain can do at speed'.[23] Eight to ten words, maximum, typically much less. The rest of our thinking on any matter is a hazy 'penumbra', just out of ken.[24]

## SUDDENNESS DEFINED

Everyone knows these moments: you launch into an argument and realise mid-flight you can't recall the exact data, or the salient details or the persuasive example to back up your claims. Other times you are in the middle of telling a story and completely forget what the point you are rounding to actually was. These are lovely moments because they show that the speaker has been 'bold enough to trust to luck and make a start'.[25] To try the crazy experiment of bringing to mind every single thing you know on a topic in one and the same moment is to be reminded that these risks are central to the knowledge enterprise as well. A truer picture of knowledge will arise when we admit that scholars and scientists alike – there are no 'two cultures' in this regard – weave the public speaking that is so central to their work from a combination of memory work and trust. They launch themselves into speech, trusting in the capacity of their memories to supply the requisite words that

can only ever be dimly present at the invocation of any topic, however much one might have 'mastered' it. The *sapere aude* maxim – 'Dare to know!' – that Kant advanced in his essay 'What is Enlightenment?' obviously refers to observation and method; but it can also, and in some regards even more vitally, be linked to the daring that allows these meetings of memory and language to occur, as one advances step by step into one's public discourse.[26]

The fact that happy finds at times result is surely one of the prime reasons we continue to have conferences. One might draw an analogy to painting: 'In the way I work I don't in fact know very often what the paint will do, and it does many things which are very much better than I could make it do. Is that an accident? Perhaps one could say it is not an accident because it becomes a selective process which part of this accident one chooses to preserve' (Francis Bacon).[27] It is also, of course, why we interview politicians, for all their training in staying 'on message'. They, too, fall short of total mastery over *what the words will do.*

We lack the cognitive capacity to see clearly in our mind the exact wording of what we are about to say, in advance of the two or three seconds in which we come to say it. This is what I am calling *suddenness*. It is the condition of all acts of speaking, and a key factor in the shapes our writing takes as well.

One might respond that 'the exact wording' of our speech is generally irrelevant, as evidenced by the rapidity with which we forget it: all that really count are the ideas that drive us as we speak, or that we distil from another's speech as we hear it. Yet that would be to ignore those chance finds, as for instance when we are struggling to explain a concept in a lecture and, in the course of trying to imagine things from the student's perspective, alight upon an illuminating metaphor, that puts our work in a whole new light.

Others will batten down on the conventionality of our speech, the fact that so much of our discourse amounts to mere mimicry of what we have heard, something hardly original enough to merit comparison with the creative processes of a Kleist, a Bacon or a Kant. Consider the 'irreducibly conformist, retarded, academic recursion' besetting so much scholarly commentary on Freud and Marx.[28] That was Lacan's verdict. Marx, for his part, noted, 'The tradition of all past generations weighs like an Alp (*wie ein Alp*) upon the brain of the living'.[29] 'Like an Alp' is a more accurate translation than the familiar 'like a nightmare'. It is more accurate, because more alive to the enormity of that burden. 'But although the atmosphere in which we live, weighs upon every one with a 20,000 lb. force, do you feel it?', Marx asks elsewhere.[30] Perhaps a Mirabeau does ('Yes, my dear sir . . . we have heard it'). My point is that there is no creation *ex nihilo* and the concept of suddenness is not intended to imply any. To the contrary, the topic of conventional speech is central to this book and will emerge as pivotal to the theory of 'original' poetic diction in which it culminates. That argument will hold

that what we call originality is not the opposite to, but rather is implied by, conventionality; the arbitrary restrictions of the latter act for poets as a kind of index to what is not typically but might be said. As for suddenness, one's 'exact wording' may be as statistically predictable as corpus linguists are increasingly showing it to be ('Adjectives are four times more common in academic prose than in conversation'), ridden with hegemonic relations of power, and even just plain banal.[31] But it is still not specifically known from the outset, and particularly not by the subject speaking, just what exact words will rise to meet their intention to talk of a given thing, as they clause-by-clause give voice to it. However well one knows one's topic, and even however much one tries to circumscribe one's speech, an element of suddenness always pertains. This can have massive consequences.

*I don't in fact know very often what the paint will do.*

But we can choose our words, surely? At least sometimes. *Carefully choosing one's words* even exists as a conventional phrase for the act. Surely there is a difference, the objection would continue, between giving yourself over to whatever words come to you in speaking on an uncertain topic, and that *careful choosing* we see the PhD candidate undertaking in the transcript from Pawley and Syder above, as he tries to distinguish the exact nuances of the words he is on the point of uttering, so much so that he regularly disrupts the fluency of his speech to do so (and is fostered in this, Pawley and Syder note, by the broader academic environment, as a space 'where exactness rather than fluency is most valued').[32] Surely what we have here is a clear distinction between the *thinking by speaking* Kleist promotes, and the rather more respectable act of *thinking before speaking*? These are important distinctions, because they bring to the fore the question of technique, and the varying results it can engender. But whatever nuances we might import, suddenness cannot be relegated solely to the artist's willed openness to the new. It accompanies our in-the-moment striving to choose our words carefully as well. For what actually is the act of thinking before speaking, in the close-up sense we have been considering, as the candidate meditates the next move from clause (2) to clause (3)? Is it not that one trains one's thoughts towards some specific thing – an idea, an object, a goal, a combination of all three even – the words rise to meet that intending, and one selects (or is it, encourages?) those that seem most appropriate to utter aloud? The key point here is that however careful and even wary we might be on such occasions, the initial act of speaking, the one that occurs in our heads, cannot itself be pre-meditated. Otherwise put, we cannot plan our thoughts. We say them to ourselves, finding out what they are in the process. Thinking, inasmuch as it is verbal, is itself a kind of *thinking by speaking*. The fact that thinking can happen aloud, as Kleist insists, is simply to shift the terrain a little. Thinking is suddenness in essence. Its happy finds are dependent on the fact that we lack the cognitive

capacity to know the *exact* wording of what we are about to say, in advance of the second or two in which we come to utter it. This is what I am calling *suddenness*. It is the condition of all speaking, including to ourselves.

## THE QUESTION DRIVING THIS BOOK

Our thoughts do not always take verbal form. But they obviously must do so for us to write. The topic of this book is the writing of poems.

Verse might constitute the exception to that colossal forgetting noted above, a reminder, well preceding the mechanical recording devices which proved it, that our focus when speaking is far more local and intense than the prose sentence would pretend. Does verse not show us, in its line-by-line insistence, the staggering of speech into tight yet somewhat loosely connected blocks of sudden, focal attention?

Perhaps this was the point of Quintus Horatius Flaccus's celebrated contention, *ut pictura poesis*: 'poetry is like painting'. We tend to feel, even though the experience often undermines this certainty (Kant noted a wavering on the matter as the effect of beauty), that we can hold a painting in a glance.[33] Similarly, and even as the diction invites us to dwell on what keeps exceeding our immediate grasping, the bounding of speech by line-break and/ or caesura approximates the amount of words we can form, or take in, in any given focus of attention. One moves to the next line, and then the next, like a tour of a gallery.

Conversely, we might say that poetry is like painting because its surface illusion of immediacy – the patina of suddenness – is slowly, iteratively, perhaps lovingly constructed.

We come to the question driving this book: Kleist's fragmentary essay, 'On the Gradual Production of Thoughts whilst Speaking', is silent on poetic composition's relation to the suddenness its poet-author observes in speech and theorises so acutely. The essay is silent on the act of writing in general. That a writer of Kleist's calibre should fail to connect his discussion of epiphany in speaking to the artform that most either captures or evokes it is odd. Nor do we have any evidence that his proposed continuation of the fragment would have said anything about writing, or indeed art of any stamp, as Kleist scholar, Hilda Brown, points out.[34] It is just possible that Kleist thought 'the gradual production of thoughts whilst speaking' had nothing in common with the writing of poems at all. Regardless of what Kleist thought, the point is that we ourselves have no clarity on the matter. The aim of this book is to repair that omission. It investigates the relationship between the act of speaking – as one speaks at any given moment, casting around for the right words, till something comes to mind – and the composition of poems for the

contemporary page. Does written poetic composition rely on the same sudden mechanisms that speaking and thinking do, when generating the language it frames in lines?

Or does the fact of writing entail some other process?

## APPROACH

Investigating the relationship between the writing of poems and *suddenness*, as here defined, will illuminate the relationship between poetry and thinking, one of philosophy's oldest questions, here treated from the more or less novel perspective of production. In focussing on the very seconds in which poetic thought is composed, this book will simultaneously provide a testing-ground for the severe anti-Romanticism that has become such a bulwark of our thinking about creative production for the last half-century, with its principled repudiation of words like 'individual', 'spontaneous' and 'unpremeditated'.[35] Finally, this approach, via the concept of suddenness, will raise questions about prose writings like this very book, in relation to the stark gap between the coherent, sentence-based thinking it ideally conveys, and the massive, years-long artifice necessary to produce that appearance. What kind of 'thinking' can monographs, articles and, for that matter, works of philosophy, be said to convey, once we take seriously that thought's multiply-revised form?

The questions are significant. But they fly in the face of a philosophical tradition of some decades' standing, and it will be worth justifying that from the outset. I am referring to a kind of cultural blockage affecting attempts to operationalize distinctions between speech and writing in forums like this one. There are good reasons for it. In undermining any strict distinction between the two, on the Saussurean but also post-Saussurean grounds that both materialise in signifiers (the sound in the air, the mark on the page), the identity of which can only ever be differential, Jacques Derrida rightly undercut certain hegemonic claims as to the pre-eminence of one over the other, whether these were in the service of the European invader's purportedly civilizing mission, or in celebration of the spontaneity of the unlettered, those supposedly closer to nature. Derrida effected this by proposing a far more inclusive concept of writing, one coextensive with the signifier itself: 'we say "writing" for all that gives rise to an inscription in general, whether it is literal or not and even if what it distributes in space is alien to the order of the voice'.[36] This approach did not hinder Derrida from making supple and revealing distinctions about the workings of sound and meaning in literary texts.[37] But in the context of the global uptake of post-structuralism, the massification of Derrida's already huge metaphor of writing (in *Of Grammatology*, he suggests cinematography, choreography, sculpture, political action and even athletics might all be taken

as forms of writing) had some unfortunate consequences, the most ironic of which was the failure of critical theorists to take on board the stark differences between the ways we use language when speaking and the ways we use it when writing, differences that were becoming increasingly apparent to linguists over those same decades, due to the diffusion of cheap recording devices noted above.[38] Pertinently, a commitment to an epochal indistinction between speaking and writing did not stop theorists from attending conferences. Evidently writing, in the specific sense of pen, typewriter or keyboard, does import some difference to the workings of our language and its interface with thought. But to unpack just what, we need to reopen distinctions between it and speaking – without abandoning the concept of the signifier, or post-structuralist approaches to history and discourse more generally.

This book proposes three approaches to the question of how the composition of real-time speech – with all its attendant suddenness – relates to poetry writing. The striking differences between spoken and written languages will obviously play a key role. But not for some pages. The concepts introduced to this point have an extremity to them and they need to be leavened by other voices, the better to test their reality. Also, for a book about the production of poetry, sudden or otherwise, to be at all persuasive, we need to hear from the poets themselves. Part I, the first of my three approaches, is accordingly based on an archive of research interviews my colleagues and I have recorded with Anglophone poets over the past 15 years, with focus on those poets' responses to one specific question. That question contained a quotation from W.H. Auden's 1967 lecture on 'Words and the Word'. In it, Auden implies a relation between original poetic thinking and not knowing what you have to say, until you have said it. The topic of suddenness is thus never far from the surface of these discussions. But I try to bring the poets' own analyses and terms to the fore, rather than my own. This ethnographic approach takes up much of Part I, and also threads through the book as a whole. But, just as it would be remiss not to take one's bearings on the matter of poetic composition from poets themselves, one can hardly ignore the considerable scholarly work on our topic, the most illuminating examples of which concern historical materials. The second approach involves mining that scholarship. I do so throughout the book, but devote Part II specifically to the historical arm of it, with focus on what light two particular histories might shed on the relationship between the suddenness of speaking and poetic composition now. The point is not, however, to treat those two prior cultures as cognate with our own, along the lines of whatever universalism one might choose. The past is figured over those chapters in the manner Walter Benjamin espoused in his 'Theses on the Philosophy of History': as a site for estrangements, flashpoints of similarity and difference, that lead us to reconsider key aspects of the present.[39] Parts III and IV draw these on-the-ground and historical materials into

an engagement with the linguistic and cognitive research introduced above, which constitutes the book's third and final approach to the questions at hand. A theory of the composition of written verse, based on the spurt-like chunks in which we actually speak and it would seem think, emerges in Part III. Part IV culminates in a second theory, concerning what Samuel Taylor Coleridge called 'the true nature of poetic diction'.[40] It is based on the severe constraints which the narrow window of conscious attention imposes on our capacity to generate language in the moment, the formulaic phrasing we rely on as a result, and the poetic thinking this in turn makes available, by implying that vast reaches of any given language are at once sayable and intelligible but unlikely ever to be said.

Parts III and IV thus supply direct answers to the questions raised in this introduction. Some readers may want to head straight to them. Parts I and II provide vital context to those answers. The whole proceeds by way of a story, concerning the divided responses that a particular question elicited from a cohort of contemporary poets.

Ngunnawal Country, 2021

## NOTES

1. Kleist, "Gradual Production of Thoughts," 405.
2. Kleist, 406.
3. Kleist, 406.
4. Kleist, 406.
5. Kleist, 406.
6. Kleist, 406.
7. Kleist, "Reflection, a Paradox."
8. Kleist, qtd in Brown, *Heinrich von Kleist*, 49.
9. Kleist, "Feelings before Friedrich's Seascape," 231.
10. Kleist, "Gradual Production of Thoughts," 408.
11. Kleist, 408.
12. Kleist, 409.
13. Halliday and Matthiessen, *Functional Grammar*, 51.
14. Halliday and Matthiessen, 51.
15. Chafe, *Discourse, Consciousness and Time*, 50.
16. Q, qtd in Pawley and Syder, "Two Puzzles," 201 (my numbering).
17. Kleist, "Gradual Production of Thoughts," 406.
18. Kleist, 406.
19. Chafe, *Thought-Based Linguistics*, 49.
20. Chafe, 49, 97.
21. Pawley and Syder, "Two Puzzles," 202.
22. Pawley and Syder, 203.

23.  Pawley and Syder, "One-Clause-at-a-Time," 165.
24.  James, "Stream of Thought," 46.
25.  Kleist, "Gradual Production of Thoughts," 406.
26.  Kant, "Answer to the Question," 11.
27.  Bacon, qtd in Sylvester, *Interviews with Francis Bacon*, 16–17.
28.  Lacan, *Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 71.
29.  Marx, *Der achtzehnte Brumaire*, 97 (my translation).
30.  Marx, "Anniversary of the People's Paper," 427.
31.  Biber and Vásquez, "Writing and Speaking," 542.
32.  Pawley and Syder, "Two Puzzles," 201.
33.  Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, 99–104.
34.  Brown, *Heinrich von Kleist*, 81.
35.  For example, Boden, "What is Creativity?", 75; McGann, "Romanticism and its Ideologies," 592; Sawyer, *Explaining Creativity*, 322.
36.  Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 9.
37.  Derrida, "Two Words."
38.  Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 9.
39.  Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History."
40.  Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1.

*Part I*

# REVISING TOWARDS
# SPONTANEITY